We are in a crisis of belonging, of who, what, when, and where. More and more people feel as though they do not belong, more and more people are applying to belong, and more and more people are not counted as belonging. It is a crisis of culture and population, of living together. This chapter addresses the crisis through three principal foci: the social significance of culture, the dislocation of populations, and the response of cultural citizenship. I establish that culture increasingly operates as a resource for nations, note why this is necessary given their increasing cultural mixing (particularly in the United States), and interrogate responses via cultural citizenship that seek to operationalize resources for living together.

**Culture**

The word “culture” derives from the Latin *colare*, which implies tending to and developing agriculture as subsistence. With the emergence of capitalism’s division of labor, culture came both to embody instrumentalism and abjure it via the industrialization of farming on the one hand, and the cultivation of taste on the other. In keeping with this distinction, culture has usually been understood in two registers via the social sciences and the humanities—truth versus beauty. This was a heuristic distinction in the sixteenth century, but it became substantive over time. Eighteenth-century German, French, and Spanish dictionaries bear witness to a metaphorical shift into spiritual cultivation. The spread of literacy and printing saw customs and laws passed on, governed, and adjudicated through the written word as textualization supplemented and supplanted force as a guarantor of authority via such pointed...
satire as prints celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act in colonial America. During the same period, consumer society developed, through horse racing, opera, art exhibits, masquerades, and balls. There is a simple demographic corollary. Britain, for example, had a population of 9,000,000 at the commencement of the nineteenth century, of whom 20 percent lived in towns. It was self-sufficient in agriculture. But with the Industrial Revolution, half the population became urban dwellers. Food was imported, and cultures developed textual forms that could be exchanged (Williams 1983, 38; Benhabib 2002, 2; de Pedro 1999, 61–62, 78n1; Briggs and Burke 2003, 10, 38, 60; Jones 2003).

Culture is now a marker of differences and similarities in taste and status within groups. In today’s humanities, theater, film, television, radio, art, craft, writing, music, dance, and games are judged by criteria of quality and meaning, as practiced critically and historically. For their part, the social sciences focus on the languages, religions, customs, times, and spaces of different groups, as explored ethnographically or statistically. So whereas the humanities articulate differences through symbolic norms (for example, which class has the cultural capital to appreciate high culture, and which does not), the social sciences articulate differences through social norms (for example, which people cultivate agriculture in keeping with spirituality, and which do not) (Wallerstein 1989). This bifurcation also has a representational impact, whereby the “cultural component of the capitalist economy” is “its socio-psychological superstructure” (Schumpeter 1975, 121). The impact is indexed in cultural labor: the poligrafi (what would now be called “professional writers”) of fifteenth-century Venice and the hacks of eighteenth-century London generated popular and influential conduct books, works of instruction on everyday life that marked the textualization of custom and the emergence of new occupational identities (Briggs and Burke 2003, 57).

This venerable switching point between customary and aesthetic cultures continues to fascinate: in the three decades leading up to 2000, the number of self-help books in the United States more than doubled, and between a third and a half of Yanquis bought one, lending their credit to a $2.48 billion-a-year industry of tapes, DVDs, videos, books, and “seminars” on making oneself anew—a whole array of consumables in place of adequate social security. The U.S. population spends $700 million per year on self-help literature, and one fifth of the public has read crossover titles between evangelical Christianity and self-help, as per the Left Behind series. Each item promises fulfillment while delivering a never-ending project of work on the self (McGee 2005, 11–12; Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion and Department of Sociology 2006; “Centrifugal Forces” 2005).
The canons of judgment and analysis that once flowed from the humanities/social sciences distinction (and kept aesthetic tropes somewhat distinct from social norms) have collapsed in on each other: “Whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well, whether this is his [sic] intention or not” (Adorno 1996, 93). Art and custom have become resources for markets and nations—reactions to the crisis of belonging, and to economic necessity. Collective concerns with maintaining and developing a “cultural legacy” have been supplemented by commercial drives to “invent and create new forms of culture”—not as a side effect, but in place of agriculture and manufacturing (Venturelli n.d., 16). As a consequence, culture is more than textual signs or everyday practices. It also provides the legitimizing ground on which particular groups (e.g., African Americans, gays and lesbians, the hearing impaired, or evangelical Protestants) claim resources and seek inclusion in national narratives. And culture is crucial to both advanced and developing economies as a service, a textual export, and a source of dignity and mutual aid (Yúdice 2002, 40; 1990; Martín-Barbero 2003, 40).

This intermingling has implications for both aesthetic and social hierarchies. Culture comes to “regulate and structure . . . individual and collective lives” (Parekh 2000, 143) in competitive ways that harness art and collective meaning for governmental and commercial purposes. So the Spanish minister for culture can address Sao Paolo’s 2004 World Cultural Forum with a message of cultural maintenance that is about both economic development and aesthetic and customary preservation. Culture is understood as a means to growth via “cultural citizenship,” through a paradox—that universal (and marketable) value is placed on the specificity of different cultural backgrounds. Similarly, Taiwan’s premier can broker an administrative reorganization of government as a mix of economic efficiency and “cultural citizenship” (quoted in “Foro Cultural” 2004; “Yu to Propose 5 Fresh Policy Goals Today” 2004).

This simultaneously instrumental and moral tendency is especially important in the United States, albeit in a rather different way, for the United States is virtually alone among wealthy countries, both in the widespread view of its citizens that their culture is superior to that of others and in the successful sale of that culture around the world (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2003; Miller et al. 2001, 2005). The United States has blended preeminence in the two cultural registers, exporting both popular prescriptions for entertainment (the humanities side) and economic prescriptions for labor (the social-sciences side). These have become signs and sources of the global crisis of belonging, even as their sender displays a willful ignorance of why the rest of the world may not always wish to follow its example despite buying its
popular culture (Carreño 2001, 22). But the United States wrestles with its own cultures, too.

Immigrants are crucial to the nation’s foundational ethos of consent because they represent alienation from their origin and endorsement of their destination. Bonnie Honig (1998) has shown that immigrants and their cultures have long been the limit case for loyalty, as per Ruth the Moabite in the Jewish Bible or Old Testament. Such figures are both perilous for the sovereign-state (where does their fealty lie?) and symbolically essential (as the only citizens who make a deliberate decision to swear allegiance to an otherwise mythic social contract). This makes achieving and sustaining national culture all the more fraught, for just as their memory of what has been lost is strong, so is their host’s necessity to shore up “preferences” expressed for U.S. norms. Liberal philosophy long held that the integration of migrants would follow from the acquisition of citizenship and a nondiscriminatory, culture-blind application of the law once successive generations mastered the dominant language and entered the labor market as equals with the majority. But the patent failure to achieve this outcome saw governments recognizing cultural differences, intervening to counter discrimination in the private sector, and imposing quotas for minority hiring (Kymlicka 2000, 725).

This has led in turn to a reaction from neoliberalism and conservatism against such state participation, on economic and nationalist grounds. Multiculturalism, a movement founded in respect for difference, is accused of a “racial particularism” that threatens liberalism (Alexander 2001, 238) through the assiduous efforts of sinister-sounding “ethnocultural political entrepreneurs” who mobilize constituencies devoted to “sectional demands” (Barry 2001, 21). Journalist Peter Brimelow (1996) of the Center for American Unity says that U.S. Latinos comprise “a strange anti-nation,” and the Center for Immigration Studies, a right-wing think tank, bemoans the advent of “post-Americans” who have “a casual relationship” with the United States rather than a love affair, typifying them as citizens “of nowhere in particular” (Krikorian 2004). (Count me in.) Kennedy staffer, pop historian, and pundit Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., (1991) diagnoses a “disuniting of America” through the revival of “ancient prejudices” by academic multiculturalists who imagine then concretize social divisions that barely existed beforehand. Reagan bureaucrat, pop ethicist, and serial gambler William J. Bennett (1992) calls for a “cultural war” that will reinforce “traditional” values. He opposes today’s counterhistories that threaten previously dominant Whiggish narratives of a nation led by great men in thrall of the beacon of democracy. The outcome is a threat to the golden heritage of Jeffersonian democracy (when propertied men were voters, women were emotional and
physical servants, African Americans were slaves, and native peoples fought to survive).

Dislocation

A global population crisis began in the 1960s and has continued since because of several factors: changes in the global division of labor, as manufacturing left the first world and subsistence agriculture was eroded in the third world; demographic growth through unprecedented public-health initiatives; increases in refugees following numerous conflicts among satellite states of the United States and the Soviet Union; transformations of these struggles into intra- and transnational violence when half the imperial couplet unraveled; the associated decline of state socialism and triumph of finance capital; vastly augmented human trafficking; the elevation of consumption as a site of social action and public policy; renegotiation of the 1940s–1970s compact across the West between capital, labor, and government, reversing that period's redistribution of wealth downward; deregulation of key sectors of the economy; the revival of Islam as a transnational religion and political project; and the development of civil-rights and social-movement discourses and institutions, extending cultural difference from tolerating the aberrant to querying the normal, and commodifying the result. The dilemmas that derive from these changes underpin political theorist John Gray's critique of “the West’s ruling myth . . . that modernity is a single condition, everywhere the same and always benign,” a veritable embrace of Enlightenment values (2003, 1). Modernity has just as much to do with global financial deregulation, organized crime, and religious violence as it does with democracy, uplift, and opportunity, and it has just as much to do with neoliberalism, religion, and authoritarianism as it does with freedom, science, and justice (Gray 2003, 1–2, 46).

Of the approximately 200 sovereign states in the world, over 160 are culturally heterogeneous, and they are comprised of 5,000 ethnic groups. Between 10 and 20 percent of the world’s population currently belongs to a racial and linguistic minority in their country of residence, and 900 million people affiliate with groups that suffer systematic discrimination. Perhaps three-quarters of the world system sees politically active minorities, and there are more than 200 movements for self-determination in nearly 100 states (Thio 2002; Abu-Laban 2000, 510; Brown and Ganguly 2003, 1n1; Falk 2004, 11). Even the “British-Irish archipelago,” once famed “as the veritable forge of the nation state, a template of modernity,” has been subdivided by cultural difference as a consequence of both peaceful and violent action and a revisionist historiography that asks us to note the millennial migration of
Celts from the steppes; Roman colonization, invading Anglos, Saxons, Jutes, Frisians, and Normans; attacking Scandinavians; trading Indians, Chinese, Irish, Lombards, and Hansa; and refugee Europeans and Africans (Nairn 2003, 8).

There are now five key zones of immigration—North America, Europe, the Western Pacific, the Southern Cone, and the Persian Gulf—and five key categories of immigration: international refugees, internally displaced people, voluntary migrants, the enslaved, and the smuggled. The number of refugees and asylum seekers at the beginning of the twenty-first century was 21.5 million—3 times the figure 20 years earlier (United Nations Development Programme 2004, 6, 2; Massey 2003, 146; Cohen 1997). The International Organization for Migration estimates that global migration increased from 75 million to 150 million people between 1965 and 2000, and the United Nations says that 2 percent of all people spent 2001 outside their country of birth, more than at any other moment in history. Migration has doubled since the 1970s, and the European Union (EU) has seen arrivals from beyond its borders grow by 75 percent in the last quarter century (Castles and Miller 2003, 4; Annan 2003).

This mobility, whether voluntary or imposed, temporary or permanent, is accelerating. Along with new forms of communication, it enables unprecedented cultural displacement, renewal, and creation between and across origins and destinations. Most of these exchanges are structured in dominance: the majority of international investment and trade takes place within the first world, while the majority of immigration is from the third world to the first world (United Nations Development Programme 2004, 30; Schweder, Minow, and Markus 2002, 26; Pollard 2003, 70; Sutcliffe 2003, 42, 44).

In response to new migration, there are simultaneous tendencies toward open and closed borders. Opinion polling suggests that sizable majorities across the globe believe their national ways of life are threatened by global flows of people and things. In other words, their cultures are under threat. At the same time, they feel unable to control their individual destinies. In other words, their subjectivities are under threat. Majorities around the world oppose immigration, largely because of fear. No major recipient of migrants has ratified the United Nation’s 2003 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, even though these countries benefit economically and culturally from these arrivals (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2003, 2004; Annan 2003).

There have been many outbursts of regressive nationalism, whether via the belligerence of the United States, the anti-immigrant stance of Western Europe, or the crackdown on minorities in Eastern Europe, Asia, and the
The populist outcome is often violent, resulting in, for example, race riots in thirty British cities in the 1980s, pogroms against Roma and migrant workers in Germany in the 1990s and Spain in 2000, the *intifadas*, migrant-worker and youth struggles in France in 1990 and 2005, and so on. Virtually any arrival can be racialized, though particularly negative feelings are reserved for expatriates from former colonies (Downing and Husband 2005, xi, 7). The two most important sites of migration from the third world to the first world—Turkey and Mexico—see state and vigilante violence alongside corporate embrace in host countries, while donor nations increasingly recognize the legitimacy of a hybrid approach to citizenship (Bauböck 2005, 9).

Throughout the generous and tortured, selfish and thoughtful, but above all, dialectical history of nativism and migration, the United States has desired foreign workers but excluded them from public benefits, admired them for their economic and cultural contributions but criticized their multiple affinities, and claimed them as signs of ethical superiority but questioned their utility. This dialectic continues, wavering constantly between amiable acceptance and collective condemnation, an ongoing oscillation between patrician policies of welcome and populist pieties of rejection (Coutin 2003).

The first great wave of immigration, at the turn of the twentieth century, left the United States 87 percent white or European American, a proportion that remained static through the 1950s. The twentieth century saw the U.S. population grow by 250 percent (the equivalent figures are under 60 percent for both France and Britain). In the past decade, the country’s Asian and Pacific Islander population increased by 43 percent, and its Latino population by 38.8 percent. Between those two groups and African Americans and Native Americans, about 100 million U.S. residents can now define themselves as minorities. Latinos and Asians in the United States are proliferating at 10 times the rate of whites, such that today, the percentage of white Americans is down to 70 percent of the population. It is projected to be 53 percent in 2050. The foreign-born segment of the country is 34 million—representing double the proportion in 1970 and an increase by half the figure of foreign-born citizens in 1995—and immigration across the 1990s was up 37.7 percent compared to the previous decade. Almost half the people living in Los Angeles and Miami were born outside the country, and Latinos accounted for half the growth in the U.S. population between 2003 and 2004. Latino immigrants were also appearing in new sites, like Iowa and North Carolina. After a downturn following the economic and security failures of the new century, by 2004, numbers were on the rise again (United Nations Development Programme 2004, 99; “The Americano Dream” 2005;
Massey 2003, 143; Hispanic Fact Pack 2005; Passel and Suro 2005). As for the labor force, in 1960, 1 in 17 workers was from outside the United States, mostly from Europe. Today, the proportion is 1 in 6, the majority being from Latin America and Asia. And the trend is accelerating. Between 1996 and 2000, people born overseas comprised close to half the net increase in the labor force (Mosisa 2002, 3). Migrants are also disproportionately represented among the poor, with 1 in 5 being from Latin America, while foreigners in general receive 75 cents for every dollar paid to Yanquis by employers. Of course, these official figures do not disclose the full picture. It has been suggested that 9 million people live in the United States without immigration documents, and they are joined by 300,000 new arrivals annually. In addition, hybridity is increasingly the norm. In 1990, 1 in 23 U.S. marriages crossed race and ethnicity. In 2005, the figure was 1 in 15, an increase of 65 percent (Tienda 2002; Mosisa 2002, 9; Castles and Miller 2003, 5; Schweder, Minow, and Markus 2002, 27; El Nasser and Grant, 2005a, 2005b).

Across the nation, applications to become a citizen have increased in volume over the past decade in response to legislative, economic, and cultural shifts (Freeman et al., 2002). And yet this is also a moment when dispositifs for understanding populations have become less and less accurate because many minorities mistrust the state and do not provide the data requested. This has cast the U.S. Census into a crisis over the last 15 years (Hannah 2001, 519). In addition, the increased number of people of Spanish-language descent has compromised the methods of racialization that the U.S. government and U.S. marketers, politicians, and social movements have nourished over the past 200 years. Neither the federal census, nor social-science orthodoxy, nor Latinos accept “Hispanic” as a race in the way that they and others accept—albeit ambivalently—Asian, black, Native American, white, Pacific Islander, or “mixed” heritage as races. In the 2000 Census, 42 percent of Latinos selected “some other race” as the category that best illustrated their social situation. This signifies the ambiguities of class and citizenship more than anything else, since those who identified as white were the wealthiest and had “immigration papers” (Tafoya 2004).

**Cultural Citizenship**

These complex politics form the backdrop to cultural citizenship as it has been understood within the West over the past fifteen years. Seven key formations have theorized the phenomenon, each with strong links to the public sphere. They are associated with cultural studies, sociology, anthropology, political theory, neoliberal philosophy, ethnic studies, law, history, and
international relations. How well have they done the job, and what has been their public impact?

First, cultural-studies sociologist Tony Bennett and colleagues in the Anglo Australian cultural-policy studies movement focus on a guaranteed set of competencies that governments should give citizens via “both the provision of cultural facilities and the regulation of cultural industries” across all aspects of artistic capital (Chaney 2002, 168). In a way that reads rather condescendingly, but in fact seeks to engage in an uplift and dissemination that respect popular knowledges, Bennett borrows from the liberal donnée that the most effective form of government rules via free individuals who must be given the skills to live both autonomously and socially. His primary interlocutors are the cultural bureaucracies of Australia and the Council of Europe, and his admirers include progressives in search of influence beyond affective protest and critique (“Citizenship and Cultural Policy” 2000; Bennett 1998, 2001; Miller and Yúdice 2004). Skeptical of what he sees as ludic protest against the state and capital, Bennett nevertheless recognizes that social-movement identities must be acknowledged by the modern liberal state. This line buys into the economic opportunities delivered by globalization and the need for local heritage to both counter and participate in it.

Second, Chicano anthropologist Renato Rosaldo and colleagues in Californian, Texan, and New York Chicano, Tejano, ethnic, and Latino studies look to a guaranteed set of rights for U.S. minorities, claimed at the level of the vernacular or the everyday, in order to “establish a distinct social space” through a combination of self-incorporation into the United States and the maintenance and development of a separate heritage and identity (Flores and Benmayor 1997b, 1–2). Their primary interlocutors are Chicano and Latino social movements, and their admirers include the Fresno Bee, while many of their ideas were first promoted in the New York Times as part of debates about multiculturalism in universities (Rosaldo 1997; Flores and Benmayor 1997a; Rodriguez and Gonzales 1995; “A Campus Forum on Multiculturalism” 1990).

Rosaldo sees cultural citizenship as a “deliberate oxymoron.” It bridges difference and sameness in calling for economic and political equality on the joint grounds of maintaining identity and exercising “full membership” in the wider community (1994, 402). He claims that the difficulty with encouraging minority groups in the United States to vote, and the low levels of naturalization for non-Asian minority immigrants (in the 1990s, 57.6 percent of Asian immigrants became U.S. citizens, versus 32.2 percent of Latinos [Aleinikoff 2000, 130]), can be addressed by promoting multiple affinities to “former” languages, places, or norms, and to adopted countries. This kind of thinking is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which
enforces a common criminal code but regulates civil law through minority cultures, a legacy from thousands of years during which the Dharmashastra governed via collective identities rather than individual entitlements (Parekh 2000, 191; Das 2002, 85; Beteille 1999). It also informs the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Institute for Education, which emphasizes collective as much as individual human rights, and regards cultural citizenship as a development from, and antidote to, assimilationist ideals (UNESCO Institute for Education 1999).

Third, the Canadian-based political theorist Will Kymlicka and a number of slightly heterodox Anglo American colleagues seek a rapprochement between majority white settlement, “immigrant multiculturalism” (newer voluntary migrants, who, according to Kymlicka, deserve few cultural rights) and “minority nationalism” (first peoples, the dispossessed, and the enslaved, who deserve many cultural rights) via the notion of culture as an aid to individual autonomy through engagement with collective as well as individual histories. The position is in keeping with Canada’s history as the first commonwealth country to establish its own citizenship system and its status as an official practitioner of multiculturalism since 1971 (Jenson and Papillon, 2001). And it applies elsewhere. Kymlicka’s primary interlocutors are states dealing with ethnic minorities, and his admirers include the Wall Street Journal and the United Nations Development Programme, where he served as a principal consultant for its 2004 venture into culture. The UN’s chief expert on indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, indexed this impact in his keynote address at the 2003 Congreso Internacional de Americanistas on moving from indigenous status to cultural citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, 2000; Zachary 2000; United Nations Development Programme 2004; “Chile-Indigenas” 2003).

When the Soviet Union broke up into close to twenty countries, Moscow was content to see twenty-five million ethnic Russians remain in what it refers to as “the near abroad” (Rich 2003). Its former republics had two choices in dealing with these sizable and often wealthy minorities: propound a retributive cultural nationalism that marginalized the Russian language and set religious, racial, and linguistic criteria for citizenship (which Estonia and Latvia did, relegating Russians from “setting the cultural agenda of the public sphere” to setting the agenda for “the private/communal” one); or adopt a pragmatic civic policy that offered entitlements based on territory, fealty, and labor (as was done in Ukraine and Kazakhstan) (Tiryakian 2003, 22; Laitin 1999, 314–17). The former are now trying to defuse the resultant conflicts via Russian-language schools and cultural groups—courtesy of a Kymlicka consultancy. At the same time, they seek to change their cultural image, abjuring the nomenclature “Baltic” and “post-Soviet” in favor of
“Scandinavian” and “pre-European Union.” Needless to say, they are “encouraged” to incorporate Russian minorities by the prospect of accession to EU membership and money via adherence to the European Convention on Nationality (Zachary 2000; van Ham 2001, 4; Bauböck 2005, 2–3, 5; see also Feldman 2005).

Where Rosaldo and his colleagues seek to transform citizenship in the interests of those marginalized by the majority, Bennett, Kymlicka, and their respective supporters utilize it for a general purpose that takes account of minorities. For Rosaldo, U.S. culture is distinguished by Latino disenfranchisement. Cultural difference substantively trumps formal universalism, and it is not good enough to follow the standard arms-length approach of liberal philosophy whereby state institutions adopt a neutral stance on cultural maintenance. Rosaldo is critical of neoliberalism and liberal philosophy for their myths of the accultural sovereign individual, which in fact assume a shared language and culture as the basis of government. Liberal philosophy’s “civic nationalism” involves an allegiance not merely to the state, but also to images of nationhood that stretch across public and private realms (Runnymede Trust Commission 2000, 19, 36). Kymlicka thinks along similar lines but endorses liberalism, provided that it allows real protection of minorities by government—as a matter of justice and self-interest. For Bennett, culture is a set of tools for living that derives its value from the achievement of specific purposes, rather than being expressive ends in themselves. He sees government as a project of constituting, not drawing upon, the liberal individual, and is agnostic about its sovereign-individual claims. Bennett and Kymlicka’s cosmopolitan approaches remain rooted, for pragmatic reasons, in the nation, because it is assumed to provide a boundary of fealty that can appeal to the better sentiments of its inhabitants.

The fourth theoretical formation, vocalized by the philosopher Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, is a neoliberal capture of the first three positions. In this view, cultural maintenance and development should be by-products of universal access to education, a “primary condition of free and equal citizen participation in public life” (1995, 162). Rorty opposes public funding to sustain familial or religious cultural norms, calling instead for a curriculum that will generate flexible cosmopolitans who learn about their country and its “global neighbors” (1995, 164; also see Stevenson 2003). Rorty’s argument is a culturalist restatement of human-capital nostra about individuals maximizing their utility through investment in skills, with links to Bennett’s call for citizens to learn a set of cultural competences. She rejects cross-cultural awareness as an essential component of good citizenship and justice, but endorses it as good business sense (Runnymede Trust Commission 2000, 234). This is in line with the United Nations Development Programme,
which argues that “culturally diverse societies” are necessary preliminaries to the eradication of poverty rather than a nice by-product or afterglow (2004, v).

In India, the Planning Commission, a key instrument of Nehruvian secularism and modernization in the early years of nationhood, was unfashionable by the 1990s. It gave way to such euphemisms for neoliberal projects as “empowerment” (Beteille 1999). The nation’s Central Board of Film Certification promulgates the Citizen’s Charter, which calls on the public to engage in a form of citizen censorship. The charter begins with the query, “Who will bell the cat?” avowing that “do it yourself!” is the best means of acting against movie theaters showing materials that audiences dislike. It lays out tasks that consumers should undertake when entering cinemas, such as looking for certification, categorization, deletions as per a state “cut list,” and so on—all in the name of “the interests of your fellow citizens” (2004).

In Mexico, this neoliberal trend reached its apogee when President Vicente Fox repeatedly and notoriously challenged reporters querying the record of neoliberalism with: “¿Yo por qué? . . . ¿Qué no somos 100 millones de mexicanos?” (Why ask me? . . . Aren’t there 100 million other Mexicans?) (quoted in Venegas 2003). The burden of his words—offered in such delightful company as business leeches like Carlos Slim—was that each person must assume responsibility for their material fortunes. The fact that not every one of those Mexicans has control over the country’s money supply, tariff policy, trade, labor law, and exchange rate might have given him pause. Or not. Clearly, Rorty’s instrumental approach may lead to cultural erasure, for all its cosmopolitanism. Such fellow travelers cast doubt not only on her work, but also on any cultural-citizenship formations that embrace neoliberalism tout court.

All these logics are engaged by the fifth key formation of cultural citizenship, the UK Runnymede Trust Commission’s report The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000). Its chair was the political theorist and future member of the House of Lords Bhikhu Parekh, and its secondary public face in the UK media came from Parekh’s fellow commissioner, Stuart Hall. The commission examined racial questions in national social and cultural institutions, education, policing, and welfare. The following reactions to their work give a sense of how deep cultural conflicts run within citizenship: “Sub-Marxist gibberish”; “out-of-touch nonsense”; “an insult to our history and intelligence” (“‘British’ is Already Inclusive and Elastic” 2000). The authors were accused of “a lack of loyalty and affection for Britain” (Parekh 2001). The Daily Mail reacted by producing a “list of ten dead white heroes of the last millennium” (Seaford 2001, 108). William Hague, then the leader of the Conservative Party, derided the report as an index of the left’s “tyranny of political correctness and . . . assault on British culture and history” (2000, 28), while The
Scottsman referred to it as “a grotesque libel against the people of this land and a venomous blueprint for the destruction of our country” (Warner 2000). Jack Straw, then the home secretary, rejected the linkage of Britishness to white racism (Back et al. 2002, 447).

This indicates how much can be at stake in these debates, beyond Bennett’s technical specifications of cultural-policy interventions, Rosaldo’s feel-good vernacular multiculturalism, Kymlicka’s attempt to “get along” in newly free, newly chauvinistic postsocialist environments, or Rorty’s faith in an inclusive curriculum animated by enlightened self-interest. That becomes clearer still in the sixth formation, which addresses the limits of neoliberalism. Amy Chua, a lawyer operating from a comparative ethnic studies perspective—and publishing with a U.S. trade house rather than an academic press—investigates in a global frame the intersection of neoliberalism, ethnic-minority economic oligarchies, and democracy: what happens when wealthy minorities confront popular backlashes against their economic power that gain expression in a majoritarian rejection of cultural difference. While the economy enriches “the market-dominant minority, democratization increases the political voice and power of the frustrated majority” (2003, 124). As Chua puts it, provocatively and with the clear regret of a fan of both capitalism and democracy, this is about the conundrum “that turns free market democracy into an engine of ethnic conflagration” (2003, 6).

Her work describes indigenous majorities protesting their weakness. Class, corruption, and race jumble together, as “market-dominant minorities, along with their foreign-investor partners, invariably come to control the crown jewels of the economy . . . oil in Russia and Venezuela, diamonds in South Africa, silver and tin in Bolivia, jade, teak, and rubies in Burma” (2003, 10). Free markets concentrate wealth disproportionately, while democracies concentrate politics proportionately. Political enfranchisement and its economic opposite are mediated through cultural difference, and the outcome is revolutionary. The horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s illustrate what happens when ethnonationalist populism draws on majority resentment to quash minority economic power. Empowering majorities can lead to violence against the wealthy based on cultural difference. Powerful minorities must protect their interests through benevolence (2003, 11–13, 16–17).

The seventh and most powerful formation derives from the historian and professional anti-Palestinian Bernard Lewis and cold war political scientist, Vietnam War architect, and English-only advocate Samuel Huntington. In the post-Soviet 1990s, these two men turned to culture for geopolitical explanations. Lewis (1990) coined the expression “clash of civilizations” to capture the difference, as he saw it, between the separation of church and state that
had generated the successes of the United States versus their intercalculation in Islamic nations, which had produced those countries’ subordinate status. Forget Yanqui support of authoritarian antidemocrats and coups that furthered oil exploitation—Islamic resentment is all about the United States insisting that Caesar get his due, and god his. Huntington appropriated the “clash of civilizations” to argue that future world-historical conflicts would not be “primarily ideological or primarily economic,” but rather “cultural” (1993, 22). What this does, of course, is to dematerialize politics—and most specifically, excuse the policies and programs of the United States government and corporations as only broadly relevant to the loathing of that nation elsewhere.

In the United States, Huntington’s Olympian grandiosity was lapped up by the bourgeois media, ever-ready to embrace “a cartoon-like world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other” (Said 2001). The “clash twins” grotesque generalizations have gained immense attention over the past decade, notably since September 11, 2001. Journalists promote the notion of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil, plundering Lewis and Huntington on the differences between Western and Islamic cultures. Across the daily press and weekly and monthly magazines of ruling opinion, extrastate violence is attributed to Islam in opposition to freedom and technology, never as the act of subordinated groups against dominant ones. The New York Times and Newsweek gave Huntington room to account for what had happened in terms of his “thesis,” while others took up the logic as a call for empire, from the supposed New Left (Dissent magazine and other progressives who share this common Yanqui blind spot) to leading communitarians and even the comparatively sane neoliberals of the Economist newspaper. Arab leaders met to discuss the impact of the Lewis-Huntington conceit, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invoked it, and UNESCO’s director general prefaced that benighted body’s worthy declaration on cultural diversity with a specific rebuttal (Rusciano 2003; Said 2001; Matsuura 2001). And as the U.S. occupation of Iraq entered its third year, military commanders and senior non-commissioned officers were required to read Huntington, along with V. S. Naipaul and Islam for Dummies (Schmitt 2005).

Elsewhere, El País’s cartoonist Máximo traumatically constructed a dialogue alongside the tumbling World Trade Center as follows: “Choque de ideas, de culturas, de civilizaciones” (Clash of ideas, of cultures, of civilizations) drew the reply “Yo lo dejaría en choques de desesperados contra instalados” (I’d call it the clash of the desperate against the establishment) (quoted in García Canclini 2002, 16). The Arab News aptly typified the Lewis-Huntington thesis as “Armageddon dressed up as social science,” while Israel’s Ha-aretz regarded its “hegemonic hold” as “a major triumph” for Al-Qaeda (quoted in Rusciano 2003, 175).
Study after study has disproved Lewis and Huntington's wild assertions about growing ethnic struggle since the cold war and a unitary Islamic culture opposed to a unitary West. Such claims fatally neglect struggles over money, property, politics, and creed (Fox 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2003, 203; United Nations Development Programme 2004). The clash-of-civilizations thesis does not work if it is applied to Iran supporting Russia against Chechen rebels, India against Pakistan, or the U.S. attitude to the Iran-Iraq War. But why bother with world-historical details when you are offered “international relations with politics taken out” (Abrahamian 2003, 535)?

Huntington’s later critiques of Spanish speakers in the United States (2004) led to support from the Center for Immigration Studies and a battery of influential pop-policy intellectuals. The chorines included cold warrior Zbigniew Brzezinski, old-school area-studies founder Lucian Pye, Nixon and Reagan servant James Q. Wilson (who was also an advocate of the “broken windows” theory in support of severe punishments for minor wrongdoings), and reactionary Newsweek journalist Fareed Zakaria. The agile cultural citizens at http://www.vdare.com, self-appointed keepers of the flame of a lost tribe of Yanqui whiteness, were busy endorsing Huntington as well (Krikorian 2004; Ajami et al. 2004; Brimelow 2005). The awkward fact that just 21 percent of third-generation Latinos identify with their countries of origin, and that most U.S.-born Latinos have much more conservative views on immigration than recent arrivals (Hispanic Fact Pack 2005, 50; Suro 2005, 2) must be left out for this nonsense to flourish—not to mention the fact that Huntington’s beloved early settlers, whose ethos is supposedly central to the United States, were as wrapped up in burning witches, haranguing adulteresses, and wearing foppish clothing and wigs as they were concerned with spreading democracy (Lomnitz 2005). The argument is wrong morally, pragmatically, and empirically. But it is cultural.

**Conclusion**

The arid lands of Bennett and the humidispheres of Rosaldo, Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua illustrate the improbability of wiping from history the differences between indigenes, dominant settlers, and minority migrants. Rorty contrives a human-capital merger of all the above. Lewis and Huntington offer an ideological justification for hollowing out material history and accounting for Western hegemony in cultural terms. It seems that Bennett’s competences, Rosaldo’s resistances, and Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua’s relativisms can be accommodated (albeit with their rhetorics softened at some points and hardened at others) in a neoliberal worldview whose limits are set via the hyperculturalism and closet nationalism of the “clash” theorists. All
for the cultural in the most cultural of all possible worlds, with the capstone being an efficient and effective work force whose tolerant cosmopolitanism is brokered on a respect for difference that becomes a guarantor of individual advantage in a globally competitive labor market, along Judaeo-Christian lines.

Each of these approaches is dealing with heavily practical yet highly emotional, and profoundly populist yet avowedly technical, forms of thought. As such, they inevitably rub up against contradictions. Bennett must deal with the incommensurability of neoliberal and statist prescriptions. Rosaldo must make peace with the fact that government is frequently the court of appeal for vernacular protest. Kymlicka and Parekh must come to terms with the economic limits to liberal philosophy. Rorty must engage the obstinate collectivism and hybridity of culture and the fact that neoliberalism is no more metacultural than any other form of thought. Chua must acknowledge the constitutive inequality and brutality of capitalism. Lewis and Huntington must explain the reality of U.S. Middle Eastern policy and more precise histories than their grandiosities will allow. And all must do so in a context that Bill Clinton (2002) has correctly identified as an environment of global interdependence without global integration.

Cultural citizenship can work toward a more equitable world if it rejects the technicism, utopianism, liberalism, nationalism, and neoliberalism of business-as-usual cultural citizenship. In answer to the theoreticism and technocracy of neoliberalism, we can point to participatory and popular budgeting systems undertaken by leftist regional and urban governments in Kerala, India, Mexico City, and Porto Alegre, Brazil, over the past fifteen years, and Brazil’s sindicato cidadão (citizens’ trade union) (Chathukulam and John 2002; Heller 2001; Dagnino 2003, 7; Ziccardi 2003). We can also form strategic alliances with opponents of neoliberalism from within its complex web of self-deception, such as George Soros, who made his fortune on the financial markets but now sees that “the untrammeled intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic society” (1997).

My concern is that the cultural Left got what it wanted: culture at the center of politics and sociopolitical analysis. But it was not Queer Nation and Stuart Hall. It was creepy Christianity and Samuel Huntington. This outflanking has meant that culture can be utilized to trump progressive approaches and politics. We need to rearticulate it to the economy and to Politics (with an intentionally capitalized P), not to a misleading, antimatierialist sphere of ideation.

Note

1. I have used the Spanish word for Yankee, Yanqui, here to draw attention to the inherent problems with the term “American.”
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